Editorial: Truth as Casualty
5 April 2003
It is said that truth is always the first casualty of war. Never was that more apparent than now. With both sides in the Iraq war putting out diametrically opposed versions of events, it is impossible to know who to believe. The US says it has destroyed half of two Republican Guard divisions, each of which would have about 8,000 men and dozens of tanks; yet journalists embedded with the Americans heading toward Baghdad report seeing no bodies or burned-out tanks that would be normal after such an onslaught. There have been other US reports that likewise proved distinctly premature.
On the other side, the Iraqi Minister of Information Mohammed Saeed Al-Sahaf has turned disinformation into an art form. On Thursday, when it was apparent that American troops were closing in on Baghdad airport, he categorically denied it, saying that they were “not even 100 miles” from the city. He equally strongly denied that British forces were closing in on Basra despite evidence to the contrary from journalists. It was particularly foolish, having taken journalists to Baghdad airport to show that it was still in Iraqi hands on Wednesday, to use it to boast that the Americans were nowhere near, knowing as he must have that they were only a few kilometers away. This war is not a point-scoring game. Such deceptions only undermine the integrity of Iraq’s claims about civilian casualties and throws into doubt the soundness of Iraq’s military plans.
One thing certainly is very apparent: Iraqi tactics have been bizarre. They did not blow up any of the bridges across the Tigris to prevent the US advance; airports, notably Baghdad airport, have been left in good order for the Americans to seize and then use against the regime; the elite Republican Guards, thought to be on par militarily with the American and British troops, have put up virtually no fight whatsoever and seemingly faded away; while regular forces, who were expected to melt into thin air, have fought valiantly.
Even if the strategy is to lure the Americans into Baghdad and take them on in territory perceived as more favorable, as some suggest, the lack of sound military preparations was nonetheless grossly inept. It does not make sense to have left the road from Kuwait to Baghdad wide open. The bridges and the runways should have been blown up. The only explanation is that Saddam and his strategists did not expect this war to happen. Maybe they believed their own propaganda. With all this talk of Americans being defeated at the gates of Baghdad and being forced to leave in humiliation, it seems they still do. Or perhaps they simply do not know how to turn off the rhetoric. Certainly, to have considered expelling Al-Jazeera suggests that they must be fairly desperate.
We should know in the next 24 to 48 hours whether this war is going to last a long time or be over soon, whether US troops are going to be bogged down in an urban guerilla war, fighting for Baghdad street by street or quickly take the city. But if Basra is anything to go by, it will not be a drawn-out affair; the British now appear able to move in and out of the city, albeit with great risk. Iraqi resistance is collapsing in slow motion, more with a whimper than with a bang — and the information minister’s bravura propaganda performances cannot disguise that stark fact.
