Interesting

flavio

Banned
A War Crime or an Act of War?
By STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE


"MECHANICSBURG, Pa. — It was no surprise that President Bush, lacking smoking-gun evidence of Iraq's weapons programs, used his State of the Union address to re-emphasize the moral case for an invasion: "The dictator who is assembling the world's most dangerous weapons has already used them on whole villages, leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind or disfigured."

The accusation that Iraq has used chemical weapons against its citizens is a familiar part of the debate. The piece of hard evidence most frequently brought up concerns the gassing of Iraqi Kurds at the town of Halabja in March 1988, near the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. President Bush himself has cited Iraq's "gassing its own people," specifically at Halabja, as a reason to topple Saddam Hussein.

But the truth is, all we know for certain is that Kurds were bombarded with poison gas that day at Halabja. We cannot say with any certainty that Iraqi chemical weapons killed the Kurds. This is not the only distortion in the Halabja story.

I am in a position to know because, as the Central Intelligence Agency's senior political analyst on Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and as a professor at the Army War College from 1988 to 2000, I was privy to much of the classified material that flowed through Washington having to do with the Persian Gulf. In addition, I headed a 1991 Army investigation into how the Iraqis would fight a war against the United States; the classified version of the report went into great detail on the Halabja affair.

This much about the gassing at Halabja we undoubtedly know: it came about in the course of a battle between Iraqis and Iranians. Iraq used chemical weapons to try to kill Iranians who had seized the town, which is in northern Iraq not far from the Iranian border. The Kurdish civilians who died had the misfortune to be caught up in that exchange. But they were not Iraq's main target.

And the story gets murkier: immediately after the battle the United States Defense Intelligence Agency investigated and produced a classified report, which it circulated within the intelligence community on a need-to-know basis. That study asserted that it was Iranian gas that killed the Kurds, not Iraqi gas.

The agency did find that each side used gas against the other in the battle around Halabja. The condition of the dead Kurds' bodies, however, indicated they had been killed with a blood agent — that is, a cyanide-based gas — which Iran was known to use. The Iraqis, who are thought to have used mustard gas in the battle, are not known to have possessed blood agents at the time.

These facts have long been in the public domain but, extraordinarily, as often as the Halabja affair is cited, they are rarely mentioned. A much-discussed article in The New Yorker last March did not make reference to the Defense Intelligence Agency report or consider that Iranian gas might have killed the Kurds. On the rare occasions the report is brought up, there is usually speculation, with no proof, that it was skewed out of American political favoritism toward Iraq in its war against Iran.

I am not trying to rehabilitate the character of Saddam Hussein. He has much to answer for in the area of human rights abuses. But accusing him of gassing his own people at Halabja as an act of genocide is not correct, because as far as the information we have goes, all of the cases where gas was used involved battles. These were tragedies of war. There may be justifications for invading Iraq, but Halabja is not one of them.


In fact, those who really feel that the disaster at Halabja has bearing on today might want to consider a different question: Why was Iran so keen on taking the town? A closer look may shed light on America's impetus to invade Iraq.

We are constantly reminded that Iraq has perhaps the world's largest reserves of oil. But in a regional and perhaps even geopolitical sense, it may be more important that Iraq has the most extensive river system in the Middle East. In addition to the Tigris and Euphrates, there are the Greater Zab and Lesser Zab rivers in the north of the country. Iraq was covered with irrigation works by the sixth century A.D., and was a granary for the region.

Before the Persian Gulf war, Iraq had built an impressive system of dams and river control projects, the largest being the Darbandikhan dam in the Kurdish area. And it was this dam the Iranians were aiming to take control of when they seized Halabja. In the 1990's there was much discussion over the construction of a so-called Peace Pipeline that would bring the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates south to the parched Gulf states and, by extension, Israel. No progress has been made on this, largely because of Iraqi intransigence. With Iraq in American hands, of course, all that could change.

Thus America could alter the destiny of the Middle East in a way that probably could not be challenged for decades — not solely by controlling Iraq's oil, but by controlling its water. Even if America didn't occupy the country, once Mr. Hussein's Baath Party is driven from power, many lucrative opportunities would open up for American companies.

All that is needed to get us into war is one clear reason for acting, one that would be generally persuasive. But efforts to link the Iraqis directly to Osama bin Laden have proved inconclusive. Assertions that Iraq threatens its neighbors have also failed to create much resolve; in its present debilitated condition — thanks to United Nations sanctions — Iraq's conventional forces threaten no one.

Perhaps the strongest argument left for taking us to war quickly is that Saddam Hussein has committed human rights atrocities against his people. And the most dramatic case are the accusations about Halabja.

Before we go to war over Halabja, the administration owes the American people the full facts. And if it has other examples of Saddam Hussein gassing Kurds, it must show that they were not pro-Iranian Kurdish guerrillas who died fighting alongside Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Until Washington gives us proof of Saddam Hussein's supposed atrocities, why are we picking on Iraq on human rights grounds, particularly when there are so many other repressive regimes Washington supports?"

NY Times
 
reply in the NY Review of Books
Edward Mortimer replies:
I accept that in the specific case of Halabja the possibility that the chemical attack came from Iran (which might not have realized that Iraqi troops had already evacuated the town), or indeed from both sides consecutively, cannot be ruled out. I find it extraordinary, however, that the War College authors persist in dismissing the evidence that Iraq's armed forces used poison gas against Kurdish civilians and insurgents in late August 1988, i.e., after the end of the war with Iran. This evidence takes a number of forms:

1. State Department officials said on September 8, 1988, that US intelligence agencies had confirmed Iraq's use of chemicals in its recent drive against Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq. The same information prompted Secretary of State George Shultz, a man who had presided over a strong pro-Iraq tilt in US policy, and who continued to oppose sanctions against Iraq, to accuse Iraq of "unjustifiable and abhorrent" use of poison gas against the Kurds in a meeting on the same day with Iraqi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saadoun Hammadi. (This evidence was shared with the British government, and was subsequently described as "compelling" by then Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe.) Although there was vigorous debate between Congress and the executive branch about the policy conclusions to be drawn, in 1988 and again in 1990, there has been no difference between them about the facts of Iraqi misconduct.

2. Many eyewitness accounts were collected in Turkey between September 11 and 17, 1988, by a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff mission led by professional staff member Peter W. Galbraith and including a representative of the State Department as well as a Kurdish-speaking US government employee. This team interviewed refugees (men, women, and children) from more than thirty villages—some selected by Kurdish refugee leaders but many others chosen at random by the team itself. Most refugees said that they had seen the attacks and resulting deaths. Their accounts were striking for their detail and consistency: people from the same village who had found refuge in different parts of Turkey gave similar accounts of the attacks on their village; and survivors from different villages described a similar pattern of Iraqi attack and victim symptoms. As Galbraith says in a recent memorandum sent to The New York Review: "To disbelieve these eyewitnesses one would have to conclude that the Kurdish insurgents had organized, in a matter of days, a conspiracy to defame Iraq involving the full participation of 65,000 men, women, and children confined in camps in locations up to 200 miles apart."

The War College authors cite unnamed "experts" as saying the symptoms described by the Kurds do not conform to any known chemical or combination of chemicals. But US government experts consulted by the Senate mission said that the symptoms described were consistent with the use of mustard gas, as well as some fast-acting lethal agent, possibly nerve agents or cyanide.

3. These findings were supported in congressional testimony by Dr. Robert Cook-Deegan of Physicians for Human Rights, who led a medical team to eastern Turkey. Contrary to the assertion of the War College authors, this team of doctors was able to examine actual victims of the attacks, and found injuries resulting from blistering agents.

4. Further eyewitness testimony was collected from refugees in Iran by British journalist Gwynne Roberts, and shown on British Channel 4 television on November 23, 1988. Survivors described a massacre at Bassay Gorge, in northern Iraq, on August 29, 1988, in which something between 1,500 and 4,000 people, mainly women and children, were killed by what appears to have been a mixture of various nerve gasses while trying to reach the Turkish border. Their bodies were piled up and burnt by Iraqi troops wearing gas masks the following morning.

Roberts, a very experienced reporter, said the survivors were clearly traumatized by what they had witnessed, and their reports were completely consistent. He also entered Iraq clandestinely and brought back fragments of an exploded shell with samples of the surrounding soil, which were confirmed by a British laboratory as containing traces of mustard gas. (Nerve gas would not have left traces so long after the event.) In my review I drew attention to the fact that Roberts's evidence was completely ignored in the report of the War College authors, and I note that it is still completely ignored in their letter.

Even more extraordinary is their attempt to suggest that the US Congress provoked the invasion of Kuwait by imposing sanctions on Iraq. In fact, Congress had not enacted sanctions by the time Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2. It seems far more likely that Saddam Hussein went ahead with the invasion because he believed the US would not react with anything more than verbal condemnation. That was an inference he could well have drawn from his meeting with US Ambassador April Glaspie on July 25, and from statements by State Department officials in Washington at the same time publicly disavowing any US security commitments to Kuwait, but also from the success of both the Reagan and the Bush administrations in heading off attempts by the US Senate to impose sanctions on Iraq for previous breaches of international law.

Events have tragically borne out the warning in the report of the Senate mission in September 1988, which said: "Right now the Kurds are paying the price for past global indifference to Iraqi chemical weapons use; the failure to act now could ultimately leave every nation in peril." On that occasion the US, and the rest of the international community, failed to act. Now soldiers of the US and many other nations face a chemically armed Iraq, on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border.

NYReview
 
Theopinion piece was originally published on Jan 31, 2003 by Truthout and the NY Times. It is directly related to her book Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East published in 1990.

* edited by Gonz
 
Pure conjecture. I could also say that I'm an expert on chemical warfare, and say the same things. Doesn't prove anything. Most of all...this confusing tale is posted here as fact, just because it comes from the NY Times. If they can produce the 'classified' documents, I'd still doubt it simply because 'classified' documents are just that...classified, and publishing them before they are released by the Freedom of Information Act is illegal.
 
Gato_Solo said:
this confusing tale is posted here as fact, just because it comes from the NY Times.

It's posted simply as an article from the NY Times. I'm sure you do doubt it though.
 
Well, The NY Times sometimes does have a hard time keeping the opinion pages and the news pages separate and distinct.
 
Back
Top