HeXp£Øi±
Well-Known Member
The American Abrams tanks and Bradley tank-like vehicles now racing northward through Iraq are nearly invincible in deserts or other open spaces. The Abrams has a main gun with so much more range than the best Iraqi tank--or best tank of any nation--that, in open space, an Abrams can destroy another tank long before it draws close enough to fire back. Most anti-tank weapons splat harmlessly on the "glacis plate," or frontal armor sheet, of an Abrams--the Abrams glacis plate is considered one of the world's leading achievements in materials engineering--while the hydraulically stabilized turret of the tank allows its gunner to fire with perfect accuracy even if an Abrams is bouncing around or veering from side to side. In open areas, American armor is almost unstoppable.
But should these vehicles have to enter Baghdad, the equation changes. Frightening in the open, all tanks become vulnerable on city streets where sight lines are poor and maneuvering is constrained. The old Soviet Union rolled tanks through the old Eastern bloc to repress dissent; Israel rolls tanks through the West Bank and Gaza; China rolled tanks through Beijing in 1989. But such armor-in-cities tactics depend on local populations having no anti-tank weapons. If people in cities have anti-tank weapons--which will presumably be true in Baghdad--fierce, cost-no-object armor becomes surprisingly frail. (The primary cargo of the Karine A, the weapons ship intercepted in early 2002 on its way to make a delivery to the Palestinian Authority, was anti-tank rockets. Had they reached the streets of the West Bank and Gaza, the entire military balance there would have changed overnight, with the Israeli Defense Force constrained from entering these places.)
Why do tanks become fragile in cities? One reason is that their backsides are nowhere near as armored as their fronts. In open spaces, tanks can maneuver to keep their glacis plates facing enemy fire. In cities that may not be possible. Additionally, most tanks, the Abrams included, face all crew members forward--they can't see behind the tank. On city streets, a person can hide in the shadows with an anti-tank weapon, waiting until the tank grinds past, then fires at its weak back. The tank crew members never see what hits them.
Tanks moving slowly through cities are also vulnerable to the brave opponent who will run up, jump onto the tank, and attach a mine or--just like in the movies--open a hatch and drop in a grenade. Tankers call foot soldiers with anti-tank weapons "ants," and endlessly warn each other that ants can bite you to death.
During the German invasion of the Soviet Union in World War II, the rudimentary tactic of running up to tanks with mines cost the Panzerdivisions so many losses of their technologically superior armor that German tankers took to firing their machine guns at each other. As Panzers advanced, one would periodically turn to its neighbor and rake it with machine-gun fire to kill any Soviet soldiers who might be sneaking up or to frighten others away from trying. Shooting at your own tanks is, of course, hardly an elegant solution.
Because tanks in cities--or forests or any non-open space--are vulnerable to infantry, especially from behind, many armies, including the U.S. military, sometimes have soldiers walk behind armor. The tanks shield the soldiers at least somewhat from enemy fire, while the soldiers protect the tank from rear attack. Right now, with U.S. Abrams and Bradleys operating in open space, they are moving fast and the accompanying infantry is riding. If tanks must enter Baghdad they will likely move slowly, with American soldiers strolling behind and eyeing doors and windows warily.
Especially problematic in the ancient metropolis of Baghdad will be narrow streets in the old-city area. There are many streets in Baghdad too narrow for an Abrams to swing its turret. That means the Abrams cannon could fire only directly forward; same for its main machine gun, which is "coaxial" with the cannon, always pointing wherever the big barrel points. There is a machine gun at the commander's hatch of an Abrams, and that gun can "slew" to face any direction even if the turret is stuck. But the tank commander has to stand up in the hatch, exposing himself to fire. Owing to this restriction, it may be that only Bradleys are used if the old-city section of Baghdad must be entered. The Bradley's turret and barrel are smaller than those of an Abrams, meaning weapons can swing on narrow streets.
What's the difference between an Abrams and a Bradley? The Pentagon insists on calling the latter a Fighting Vehicle, a true "huh?" phrase. Basically, the Bradley is a baby tank. Its armor is not as magnificent as the Abrams, its engine nowhere near as powerful, and the Bradley lacks the large long-range cannon that is a tank's primary characteristic. Instead its turret contains a "chain gun," a rapid-fire light cannon for firing at anything less armored than a tank, and anti-tank missiles in case the Bradley encounters a tank and must defend itself.
When the Abrams was being designed in the 1970s, the Army and Marines toyed with the idea of becoming an all-Abrams force. But the Abrams got so expensive ($2 million or more apiece) and heavy (70 tons) that it made a lighter, less expensive complimentary piece of armor necessary. At various stages the Bradley was called a "reconnaissance tank" or a "tank escort," on the theory that it would prowl the edges of a formation of Abrams tanks. But tacticians have found they prefer to split the two into all-Abrams and all-Bradley units and that's how the machines are usually used today. Abrams personnel are higher-status because their tanks are so expensive and have a science-fiction look, while Bradley personnel consider themselves more nimble and daring than the lumbering Abrams units.
Some military analysts feared that the Bradley was too lightly armored for the modern battlefield. But in the Gulf war, Bradley units that encountered Iraqi tanks had no trouble destroying them, and there were no Bradley losses to anti-armor fire. The Marines now have a Bradley-junior machine called the Light Armored Vehicle, and apparently a Marine LAV has already wiped out an Iraqi tank near the Kuwait border, even though in theory the Iraqi tank should have had the advantage.
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=iraq&s=easterbrook032403.1
But should these vehicles have to enter Baghdad, the equation changes. Frightening in the open, all tanks become vulnerable on city streets where sight lines are poor and maneuvering is constrained. The old Soviet Union rolled tanks through the old Eastern bloc to repress dissent; Israel rolls tanks through the West Bank and Gaza; China rolled tanks through Beijing in 1989. But such armor-in-cities tactics depend on local populations having no anti-tank weapons. If people in cities have anti-tank weapons--which will presumably be true in Baghdad--fierce, cost-no-object armor becomes surprisingly frail. (The primary cargo of the Karine A, the weapons ship intercepted in early 2002 on its way to make a delivery to the Palestinian Authority, was anti-tank rockets. Had they reached the streets of the West Bank and Gaza, the entire military balance there would have changed overnight, with the Israeli Defense Force constrained from entering these places.)
Why do tanks become fragile in cities? One reason is that their backsides are nowhere near as armored as their fronts. In open spaces, tanks can maneuver to keep their glacis plates facing enemy fire. In cities that may not be possible. Additionally, most tanks, the Abrams included, face all crew members forward--they can't see behind the tank. On city streets, a person can hide in the shadows with an anti-tank weapon, waiting until the tank grinds past, then fires at its weak back. The tank crew members never see what hits them.
Tanks moving slowly through cities are also vulnerable to the brave opponent who will run up, jump onto the tank, and attach a mine or--just like in the movies--open a hatch and drop in a grenade. Tankers call foot soldiers with anti-tank weapons "ants," and endlessly warn each other that ants can bite you to death.
During the German invasion of the Soviet Union in World War II, the rudimentary tactic of running up to tanks with mines cost the Panzerdivisions so many losses of their technologically superior armor that German tankers took to firing their machine guns at each other. As Panzers advanced, one would periodically turn to its neighbor and rake it with machine-gun fire to kill any Soviet soldiers who might be sneaking up or to frighten others away from trying. Shooting at your own tanks is, of course, hardly an elegant solution.
Because tanks in cities--or forests or any non-open space--are vulnerable to infantry, especially from behind, many armies, including the U.S. military, sometimes have soldiers walk behind armor. The tanks shield the soldiers at least somewhat from enemy fire, while the soldiers protect the tank from rear attack. Right now, with U.S. Abrams and Bradleys operating in open space, they are moving fast and the accompanying infantry is riding. If tanks must enter Baghdad they will likely move slowly, with American soldiers strolling behind and eyeing doors and windows warily.
Especially problematic in the ancient metropolis of Baghdad will be narrow streets in the old-city area. There are many streets in Baghdad too narrow for an Abrams to swing its turret. That means the Abrams cannon could fire only directly forward; same for its main machine gun, which is "coaxial" with the cannon, always pointing wherever the big barrel points. There is a machine gun at the commander's hatch of an Abrams, and that gun can "slew" to face any direction even if the turret is stuck. But the tank commander has to stand up in the hatch, exposing himself to fire. Owing to this restriction, it may be that only Bradleys are used if the old-city section of Baghdad must be entered. The Bradley's turret and barrel are smaller than those of an Abrams, meaning weapons can swing on narrow streets.
What's the difference between an Abrams and a Bradley? The Pentagon insists on calling the latter a Fighting Vehicle, a true "huh?" phrase. Basically, the Bradley is a baby tank. Its armor is not as magnificent as the Abrams, its engine nowhere near as powerful, and the Bradley lacks the large long-range cannon that is a tank's primary characteristic. Instead its turret contains a "chain gun," a rapid-fire light cannon for firing at anything less armored than a tank, and anti-tank missiles in case the Bradley encounters a tank and must defend itself.
When the Abrams was being designed in the 1970s, the Army and Marines toyed with the idea of becoming an all-Abrams force. But the Abrams got so expensive ($2 million or more apiece) and heavy (70 tons) that it made a lighter, less expensive complimentary piece of armor necessary. At various stages the Bradley was called a "reconnaissance tank" or a "tank escort," on the theory that it would prowl the edges of a formation of Abrams tanks. But tacticians have found they prefer to split the two into all-Abrams and all-Bradley units and that's how the machines are usually used today. Abrams personnel are higher-status because their tanks are so expensive and have a science-fiction look, while Bradley personnel consider themselves more nimble and daring than the lumbering Abrams units.
Some military analysts feared that the Bradley was too lightly armored for the modern battlefield. But in the Gulf war, Bradley units that encountered Iraqi tanks had no trouble destroying them, and there were no Bradley losses to anti-armor fire. The Marines now have a Bradley-junior machine called the Light Armored Vehicle, and apparently a Marine LAV has already wiped out an Iraqi tank near the Kuwait border, even though in theory the Iraqi tank should have had the advantage.
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=iraq&s=easterbrook032403.1
