IAEA Reports Iran to U.N. Security Council

flavio said:
The inspections were voluntary and apparently they're still willing to discuss the Russian deal but feel it shouldn't be necessary.



Voluntary inspections and suspensions of the program.
The thing with Russia is just a stall tactic. They don't plan on ever going that way, unless forced.

and that says "voluntary inspections", but they really didn't have a choice,
unless they wanted exactly what going to happen now....sanctions, or something else.
The IAEA gave them an ultimatum.
 
catocom said:
oh, I just can't understand why some can't/won't see the stalling tactics. :confused:
Stalling?!? They voluntarily suspended the program for awhile. Their not breaking any rules. Why won't you see that? This is PNAC war marketing.

BARELY TWO years after the United States invaded Iraq in the name of weapons of mass destruction which never existed, the world is being pushed towards a confrontation with Iran on a similarly flawed premise.

On September 17, Iran's President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
told the United Nations General Assembly that his country would not give up its sovereign right to produce nuclear power using indigenously enriched uranium. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which Iran signed in 1974, allows Iran to build facilities involving all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment, subject to international safeguards. Given the fact that the U.S. continues to impose sanctions on the development of Iran's oil and gas sector (under the extra-territorial `Iran Libya Sanctions Act'), it is only logical that the Iranians should seek a civilian nuclear energy industry in which they won't have to be dependent on the West for fuel like enriched uranium.

However, as a major concession to Britain, France and Germany — the so-called EU-3 which has sought to prevail upon Iran to abandon enrichment in exchange for guarantees of assured fuel supply — Mr. Ahmadinejad offered to run his country's enrichment plants as joint ventures with private and public sector firms from other countries. Britain and France have rejected this offer, which the Iranians say is a demonstration of their intent to be as transparent as possible. The EU-3 and the U.S. insist Teheran must not work on enrichment because once the technology is mastered, the same facilities could be used to produce not just low enriched uranium (LEU) for energy reactors but highly enriched uranium (HEU) for bombs. Accordingly, they have circulated a resolution in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting — which began Monday — calling for Iran's civilian nuclear programme to be referred to the U.N. Security Council as a potential threat to international peace and security.

It is not difficult for the U.S. and its European allies to get a majority of the 35-nation Board of Governors to recommend referral; however, the board has operated on the basis of consensus for the past 12 years — ever since the forced vote referring North Korea to the UNSC split the IAEA — and the non-aligned group of countries and China remain opposed to taking Iran to the Security Council. If the U.S. is convinced a consensus will elude it for the foreseeable future, it could push for a vote this week rather than wait any longer. Next month, following the annual IAEA General Conference, a new Board of Governors will take over. And with Cuba and Syria entering the Board in place of Peru and Pakistan, the ranks of those firmly opposed to an SC referral are likely to increase.

Although the immediate trigger for the European and American pressure is Teheran's decision last month to end its voluntary suspension of uranium conversion at its Esfahan facility, the Iranian case cannot be referred to the Security Council on this ground.

First, the NPT allows uranium conversion and other processes central to enrichment. Secondly, the Esfahan facility is under IAEA safeguards and
as recently as September 2 , i.e. nearly a month after Iran resumed uranium conversion there, the Director-General of the Agency, Mohammad El-Baradei, certified that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for and, therefore, such material is not diverted to prohibited activities." Thirdly, the agreement to suspend enrichment, which Iran reached with the EU-3 at Paris last November, clearly states that "the E3/EU recognize that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation." In other words, if the voluntary suspension was not a legal obligation, the ending of that suspension can hardly be made the grounds for legal action by either the IAEA or the UN.

Myth of 'concealment'

If at all Iran is to be referred, then, its desire to pursue a complete fuel cycle for its civilian nuclear energy programme cannot be cited as legal grounds. Nor can the hitherto "secret" nature of its fuel cycle facilities currently under construction. Though there has been a surfeit of motivated and ill-informed commentary about how Iran "concealed" its uranium enrichment programme from the IAEA "in violation of the NPT" until it was "caught cheating" in 2002, the fact is that Iran was not obliged to inform the Agency about those facilities at the time. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein — who first provided the international media
with satellite imagery and analysis of the unfinished fuel fabrication facility at Natanz and heavy water research reactor at Arak on December 12, 2002 — themselves noted that under the safeguards agreement in force at the time, "Iran is not required to allow IAEA inspections of a new nuclear facility until six months before nuclear material is introduced into it." In fact, it was not even required to inform the IAEA of their existence until then, a point conceded by Britain and the European Union at the March 2003 Board of Governors meeting. The Arak reactor is planned to go into operation in 2014. As for the pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) at Natanz, it is still not operational today.

This `six months' clause was a standard part of all IAEA safeguards agreements signed in the 1970s and 1980s. It was only in the 1990s, following the Iraq crisis, that the Agency sought to strengthen itself by asking countries to sign `subsidiary arrangements' requiring the handing over of design information about any new facility six months prior to the start of construction. Many signed, some did not. Iran accepted this arrangement only in February 2003. Later that year, it signed the highly-intrusive Additional Protocol. Though it has yet to ratify it, Teheran has allowed the IAEA to exercise all its prerogatives under the protocol, including more than 20 "complementary accesses," some with a notice period of two hours or less. Dr. El-Baradei also reported that "Iran has, since October 2003, provided the Agency upon its request, and as a transparency measure, access to certain additional information and locations beyond that required under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol."

What Iran has yet to do is provide the IAEA sufficient information on the history of its centrifuge programme for it to satisfy itself that there are no "undeclared nuclear materials or activities." However, this alone can hardly constitute grounds for referring the country to the Security Council under Article III.B.4 of the Agency's Statute since the IAEA, in the past two years, has found discrepancies in the utilisation of nuclear material in as many as 15 countries. Among these are
South Korea , Taiwan , and Egypt . In 2002 and 2003, for example, South Korea refused to let the IAEA visit facilities connected to its laser enrichment programme. Subsequently, though Seoul confessed to having secretly enriched uranium to a 77 per cent concentration of U-235 — a grade sufficient for fissile material — neither the U.S. nor EU suggested referring the matter to the UNSC.

In contrast, there is no evidence whatsoever that Iran has produced weapon-grade uranium. Despite intrusive inspections, no facility or plan to produce weapon-grade uranium has been discovered, nor have any weapon designs surfaced.
Source...
 
flavio said:
Stalling?!? They voluntarily suspended the program for awhile. Their not breaking any rules. Why won't you see that? This is PNAC war marketing.
catocom said:
and that says "voluntary inspections", but they really didn't have a choice,
unless they wanted exactly what going to happen now....sanctions, or something else.
The IAEA gave them an ultimatum.
About the big red letters...
I never said they had weapons grade uranium, or the means to make it.
They just have not been "totally" open, and compliant with the IAEA.
They have complied enough to prolong action by the security counsel...
until now.
They are just riding the borderline as close as possible...but I think they just
stepped over it, unless they get more open really quick with the inspections.
 
vol·un·tar·y (vŏl'ən-tĕr'ē)
adj.
  1. Done or undertaken of one's own free will: a voluntary decision to leave the job.
  2. Acting or done willingly and without constraint or expectation of reward: a voluntary hostage; voluntary community work.
  3. Normally controlled by or subject to individual volition: voluntary muscle contractions.
  4. Capable of making choices; having the faculty of will.
  5. Supported by contributions or charitable donations rather than by government appropriations: voluntary hospitals.
  6. Law.
    1. Without legal obligation or consideration: a voluntary conveyance of property.
    2. Done deliberately; intentional: voluntary manslaughter.
Looks like they've been compliant and then some on all regulations. Why is this so hard to understand?
 
Odd, noone noted the post I made. Noone cares that U-235 is just fine for reactor fuel as is. It's used in the canadian-built CANDU reactors (regarded as the world's safest). Noone needs U-238 unless you're looking to build weapons, or more dangerous reactors (breeders, generating plutonium as waste. You do know what the only use for plutonium is, doncha?).
 
That's why I'm for, and they are against letting Russia enrich it.
The Russians would only go so far with it, and that's not Really what Iran is after.
"Part" of the politics I was referring too...

It's all BS from Iran about just wanting power. They want POWER.
Anyone that doesn't want to be blind to it can see.
 
Iran sits a top an ocean of oil.

And needs Nuclear reactors like Eskimos need ice makers.

The west doesn't want Iran to have nuclear reactors
capable of producing weapons grade Uranium
or transmuting Uranium into Plutonium.

Iran Chants Death to America the great Satan.

Iran is a backer of terrorism.

Iran is an enemy of Israel.

Iran has collaborated with North Korea in missile development.

The issue is rather clear.

Doncha think?

Oh and Flamio is silly
Doncha also ‘think?”

that the solution is rather clear?
 
Winky said:
Iran sits a top an ocean of oil.

And needs Nuclear reactors like Eskimos need ice makers.
"Iran's nuclear programme and the vision of having nuclear technology were conceived and initiated by the Shah, with assistance and encouragement from the US and Europeans in the early 1970s.

The aim was to diversify the energy sources of the country and generate 20,000 megawatts of electricity up to 1994.

Since the 1980s, when the Islamic Republic of Iran restarted the programme, the US and the Europeans have been given every opportunity to participate in the development and completion of nuclear reactors in Iran, but always refused to do so.

Since 1979, the Iranian population has more than doubled, from 32 million to nearly 70 million, and is projected to be 105 million in 2050.

Iran's installed electrical capacity is 30,000 megawatts and the country needs additional generation of 2000 megawatts each year, which under the best possible circumstances, including the immediate lifting of US sanctions and a flow of vast investment capital into Iran, cannot be produced by oil and gas alone."
Source..

Yeah Wanky, it's pretty clear that don't know what you're talkning about.
 
Those reactors were to be sold by, built by, and monitored by americans for a country that was their strongest ally in the region. Expecting anyone to react the same when said tech is controlled by a theocracy who's doctrine includes rewarding suicide is ... insane at the very best. I would remind you that mutually-assured destruction isn't going to work with muslims. I would also remind you that, while every religion goes through the same stages of fanaticism, christians did so before gunpowder.
 
Taking a hint from Profs response, as to what was said, I'd like to add a very important part, using small words.

If Iran gets their hands on any form of plutonium, there will be an explosion. Most likely in a western European country & possibly in the US. If that is not understandable to some people they are clearly either A)friends of our foes, or, B)stupid. Either way, it's a losing proposition.
 
Professur said:
Those reactors were to be sold by, built by, and monitored by americans for a country that was their strongest ally in the region. Expecting anyone to react the same when said tech is controlled by a theocracy who's doctrine includes rewarding suicide is ... insane at the very best. I would remind you that mutually-assured destruction isn't going to work with muslims.
Do you have anything to back up your speculation? May I remind you that they don't have any U-238, they are following established mandates, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which Iran signed in 1974, allows Iran to build facilities involving all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment, subject to international safeguards, and there is no evidence whatsoever that Iran has produced weapon-grade uranium. Despite intrusive inspections, no facility or plan to produce weapon-grade uranium has been discovered, nor have any weapon designs surfaced.


I would also remind you that, while every religion goes through the same stages of fanaticism, christians did so before gunpowder.
KKK, IRA, Jewish terrorists, Clinic bombers? There's Baptist terrorists in India now. They aren't fanatics though?

Gonz said:
If Iran gets their hands on any form of plutonium, there will be an explosion.
You should listen to catacom...

catacom said:
You gotta do better than a bunch of assumptions.
That's not much more than a commentary.
 
you really are quite insane

the Iranians need nuclear power?

what the they need is

a NUCLEAR STRIKE!!!

Mirv.JPG
 
You want to nuke a country that hasn't violated any mandates or regulations with absolutely no proof that they intend to produce nuclear weapons??

Yeah, I'm the insane one. :trout:
 
Could be.

I am downplaying the value unproven assumptions and encouraging following international law, regulations and the idea that diplomacy is a better alternative. You are all hopped up to ignore the established rules of society and lusting to murder vast numbers of civilians.

Traditionally the person breaking laws and killing would be more likely to have the psychological condition.

From the symptoms some likely conditions would be Persecutory Delusional Disorder, [url="http://www.halcyon.com/jmashmun/npd/dsm-iv.html#npd"]Narcissistic Personality Disorder[/url], Paranoid Schizophrenia, or [url="http://groups.msn.com/NarcissismSupportGroupMoralandSpiritualStruggle/silenceofthelambs.msnw"]Sociopathy/Psychopathy[/url]. Also, you and some others here certainly have [url="http://www.gse.harvard.edu/%7Et656_web/peace/Articles_Spring_2004/Karam_Evelyne_inciting_good_vs_evil.htm"]DMA Syndrome.
[/url]
Oh and according to the Department of Defense and several other definitions you are a terrorist.
 
Back
Top